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Abstract Bewley and Kohlberg [1976] and Mertens and Neyman [1981] have
respectively proved the existence of the asymptotic value and the uniform value
in zero-sum stochastic games with finite state space and finite action sets. In
their work, the total payoff in a stochastic game is defined either as a Cesaro
mean or an Abel mean of the stage payoffs. The contribution of this paper
is twofold: first, it generalizes the result of Bewley and Kohlberg [1976] to a
more general class of payoff evaluations, and it proves with an example that
this new result is tight. It also investigates the particular case of absorbing
games. Second, for the uniform approach of Mertens and Neyman, this paper
provides an example of absorbing game to demonstrate that there is no natural
way to generalize their result to a wider class of payoff evaluations.
Keywords Stochastic games ·Weighted payoffs · Asymptotic value · Shapley
operator · Uniform value.
Notations
– The notation “X := Y ” means “X is defined by the expression Y ”.
– If A ⊂ B, the complementary of A in B is denoted by B \A.
– The set of non-negative integers is denoted by N, and N∗ := N \ {0}.
– The set of real numbers is denoted by R, and the set of strictly positive
real numbers is denoted by R∗+.
– If (C,C ) is a measurable space, we denote by ∆(C) the set of probability
measures on C. We call δc the Dirac measure at c ∈ C. If C0 ⊂ C is a finite
set and (αc)c∈C0 ∈ ∆(C0), then
∑
c∈C0 αcδc is denoted by
∑
c∈C0 αc · c.
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Introduction
Zero-sum stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [1953]. In this
model, two players repeatedly play a zero-sum game, which depends on the
state of nature. At each stage, a new state of nature is drawn from a distri-
bution based on the actions of players and the state of the previous stage.
The state of nature is announced to both players, along with the actions of
the previous stage. Unless mentioned explicitly, we consider finite stochastic
games: the state space and the action sets are assumed to be finite.
There are several ways to evaluate the payoff in a stochastic game. For
n ∈ N∗, the payoff in the n − stage game is the Cesaro mean 1n
∑n
m=1 gm,
where gm is the payoff at stage m ≥ 1. For λ ∈ (0, 1], the payoff in the
λ− discounted game is the Abel mean ∑m≥1 λ(1 − λ)m−1gm.
Two main approaches are used to understand the properties of stochastic
games with long duration :
- The asymptotic approach aims at determining if the value vn of the n-stage
game and the value vλ of the λ-discounted game converge respectively when
n goes to infinity and λ goes to 0. Bewley and Kohlberg [1976] have proved
that in finite stochastic games, (vn) and (vλ) converge to the same limit.
This result cannot be extended to stochastic games with compact action
sets (see Vigeral [2013]). Neither can it be extended to the case of public
imperfect observation of the state of nature (see Ziliotto [2013]).
- The uniform approach analyzes the existence of strategies that are approx-
imately optimal in any n-stage game and λ-discounted game, provided that
n is big enough and λ is small enough. When this is the case, the stochastic
game is said to have a uniform value. Mertens and Neyman [1981] have
shown that finite stochastic games have a uniform value. Note that the ex-
istence of the uniform value implies the existence of the asymptotic value.
In this paper we investigate these two approaches, when payoffs are not re-
stricted to be Cesaro means or Abel means of stage payoffs. As in Cardaliaguet
et al. [2012], if π := (πm)m≥1 ∈ ∆(N∗) is a sequence of weights, the payoff
in the π − weighted game is defined as the weighted sum ∑m≥1 πmgm. Intu-
itively, a π-weighted game with long duration corresponds to the case where
the (πm)m≥1 are close to 0 (but still summing to one), but there are many
different ways to define the convergence of π to 0. Once a criterion of conver-
gence is defined, the asymptotic approach consists in determining whether or
not the value vπ of the π-weighted game converges when π goes to 0. When
this is the case, the game is said to have a general asymptotic value (with
respect to the chosen criterion). Likewise, the uniform approach deals with
the existence of strategies that are approximately optimal in any π-weighted
game, with π small enough. When this is the case, the game is said to have a
general uniform value (with respect to the chosen criterion). Two main results
can be found in literature:
- If (πm)m≥1 ∈ ∆(N∗) is decreasing with respect to m, and if the criterion
of convergence is: π1 goes to 0, then finite stochastic games have a general
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uniform value (and thus a general asymptotic value). This result stems from
the existence of the uniform value, established by Mertens and Neyman
[1981], and from Theorem 1 and Remark (4) in Neyman and Sorin [2010].
- Renault and Venel [2012] examine payoff weights that are not necessarily
decreasing with respect to time, and consider the impatience I1(π) :=∑
m≥1 |πm+1−πm| of π (see [Sorin, 2002, section 5.7]). They investigate the
limit behavior of finite stochastic games with one Player (Markov Decision
Processes) and finite POMDP (Markov Decision Processes with Partial
Observation), when I1(π) goes to 0. In this framework, they show the
existence of the general uniform value. Note that if π is decreasing and π1
goes to 0, then I1(π) = π1 goes to 0. Thus, for MDPs, this second result is
more general than the first one.
In this paper, we also define a criterion on the convergence of π to 0 un-
der which the general asymptotic value exists in stochastic games. For the
asymptotic approach, our theorem generalizes the two aforementioned results.
In addition, we provide an example which shows first that our result is tight,
and second that the result of Renault and Venel [2012] cannot be extended
to the Two-Player Case. We also show that for absorbing games with com-
pact action sets and separately continuous transition and payoff functions, a
sufficient condition under which (vπ) converges is that supm≥1 πm goes to 0
(when the action sets are finite, a sketch of proof for this last result is written
in Cardaliaguet et al. [2012]). As for the uniform approach, we provide an
example of absorbing game which shows that there is no natural way to relax
the decreasing assumption on the weights.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model of stochastic
games and some basic concepts. Section 2 deals with the asymptotic approach,
and Section 3 presents the uniform approach.
1 Generalities
1.1 Model of stochastic game
A stochastic game Γ is defined by:
- A state space K,
- An action set I (resp. J) for Player 1 (resp. 2),
- A payoff function g : K × I × J → [0, 1],
- A transition function q : K × I × J → ∆(K).
Except in Subsection 2.2, we assume that K, I, J are (nonempty) finite sets.
The initial state is k1 ∈ K, and the stochastic game Γ k1 which starts in k1
proceeds as follows. At each stage m ≥ 1, both players choose simultaneously
and independently an action, im ∈ I (resp. jm ∈ J) for Player 1 (resp. 2). The
payoff at stage m is gm := g(km, im, jm). The state km+1 of stage m + 1 is
drawn from the probability distribution q(km, im, jm). Then (km+1, im, jm) is
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publicly announced to both players.
The set of all possible histories before stagem isHm := (K×I×J)m−1×K.
A behavioral strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) is a mapping σ : ∪m≥1Hm → ∆(I)
(resp. τ : ∪m≥1Hm → ∆(J)). The set of all behavioral strategies for Player 1
(resp. 2) is denoted by Σ (resp. T ).
A pure strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) is a mapping σ : ∪m≥1Hm → I (resp.
τ : ∪m≥1Hm → J).
A Markov strategy is a strategy that depends only on the current stage and
state. A Markov strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) can be assimilated to a mapping
from N∗ ×K to ∆(I) (resp. ∆(J)).
A stationary strategy is a strategy that depends only on the current state. A
stationary strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) can be assimilated to a mapping from
K to ∆(I) (resp. ∆(J)).
The set of infinite plays of the game is H∞ := (K × I × J)N∗ , and is equipped
with the σ-algebra generated by cylinders. A triple (k1, σ, τ) ∈ K × Σ × T
induces a unique probability measure onH∞, denoted by Pk1σ,τ (see [Sorin, 2002,
Appendix D]). Let π ∈ ∆(N∗) such that∑m≥1 πm = 1. The π−weighted game
Γ k1π is the game defined by its normal form (Σ,T , γ
k1
π ), where
γk1π (σ, τ) := E
k1
σ,τ
∑
m≥1
πmgm
 .
By the minmax theorem (see [Sorin, 2002, Appendix A.5]), the game Γ k1π has
a value, denoted by vπ(k1):
vπ(k1) = max
σ∈Σ
min
τ∈T
γk1π (σ, τ) = min
τ∈T
max
σ∈Σ
γk1π (σ, τ).
When for some n ∈ N∗, πm = n−11m≤n for every m ∈ N∗, the game Γn := Γπ
is called the n-stage game, and its payoff function is denoted by γn. When for
some λ ∈ (0, 1], πm = λ(1 − λ)m−1 for every m ∈ N∗, the game Γλ := Γπ is
called the λ-discounted game, and its payoff function is denoted by γλ.
1.2 Two results in the literature
Let us fix a stochastic game Γ . Two standard definitions are recalled below:
Definition 1 The stochastic game Γ has an asymptotic value if the sequences
(vλ) and (vn) converge to the same limit, when respectively λ goes to 0 and n
goes to infinity.
Definition 2 The stochastic game Γ has a uniform value v∞ : K → [0, 1] if
for all k1 ∈ K, for all ǫ > 0, there exists (σ∗, τ∗) ∈ Σ × T and n¯ ∈ N∗, such
that for all n ≥ n¯ and (σ, τ) ∈ Σ ×T , we have
γk1n (σ
∗, τ) ≥ v∞(k1)− ǫ and γk1n (σ, τ∗) ≤ v∞(k1) + ǫ.
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Bewley and Kohlberg [1976] have proved that Γ has an asymptotic value, and
Mertens and Neyman [1981] have generalized this result in the following way:
Theorem 1 The stochastic game Γ has a uniform value v∞. In particular, Γ
has an asymptotic value, and (vλ) and (vn) converge to v∞, when respectively
λ goes to 0 and n goes to infinity.
This theorem shows that both players have strategies that are approximately
optimal in any long game Γ k1n . The existence of a stronger notion of uniform
value is then straightforward (see Theorem 1 and Remark (4) in Neyman and
Sorin [2010]): players have strategies that are approximately optimal in any
game Γ k1π with π = (πm)m≥1 decreasing with respect to m and π1 sufficiently
small. For completeness, we give a sketch of the proof of this corollary.
Corollary 1 For all k1 ∈ K, for all ǫ > 0, there exists (σ∗, τ∗) ∈ Σ ×T and
α > 0 such that for all π = (πm)m≥1 ∈ ∆(N∗) decreasing with respect to m,
and that satisfies I∞(π) := sup
m≥1
πm = π1 ≤ α, we have for all (σ, τ) ∈ Σ ×T
γk1π (σ
∗, τ) ≥ v∞(k1)− ǫ and γk1π (σ, τ∗) ≤ v∞(k1) + ǫ.
In particular, (vπ) converges to v∞ when π is decreasing and I∞(π) goes to 0.
Proof (Sketch) If π ∈ ∆(N∗) is decreasing, then the π-weighted payoff is a
convex combination of Cesaro-mean payoffs:
∑
m≥1
πmgm =
∑
m≥1
m(πm − πm+1) 1
m
m∑
l=1
gl.
The proof of the corollary follows from this equality. ⊓⊔
In the One-Player Case, by a particular case of Theorem 3.19 in Renault and
Venel [2012], this result can be extended to a wider class of weights, in the
following way:
Theorem 2 Assume that Γ is a Markov decision process, that is, the func-
tions q and g do not depend on the action of Player 2. Then Γ has a general
uniform value: for all k1 ∈ K, for all ǫ > 0, there exists σ∗ ∈ Σ and α > 0,
such that for all π ∈ ∆(N∗) that satisfies
I1(π) :=
∑
m≥1
|πm+1 − πm| ≤ α, we have
v∞(k1)− ǫ ≤ γk1π (σ∗) ≤ v∞(k1) + ǫ.
In particular, (vπ) converges to v∞ when I1(π) goes to 0.
In the next section, we study the asymptotic approach and investigate whether
we can also relax the decreasing assumption in Corollary 1 in the Two-Player
Case.
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2 Asymptotic approach
2.1 A criterion for the convergence of (vπ)
The first obvious point is that if one removes the decreasing assumption in
Corollary 1 and only assumes that I∞(π) := supm≥1 πm goes to zero, (vπ) does
not necessarily converge. Indeed consider the Markov chain which oscillates
deterministically between two states, one with payoff 1, the other one with
payoff 0. Consider two sequences of weights, one which puts weight on even
stages and one which puts weight on odd stages. The difference between these
two payoff evaluations is always equal to 1. Thus the condition I∞(π) → 0 is
not a sufficient condition to obtain the convergence of (vπ). Let us now provide
a more restrictive criterion under which (vπ) converges.
Definition 3 Let π ∈ ∆(N∗) and p ∈ (0,+∞]. The p-impatience of π is the
quantity Ip(π) ∈ (0,+∞] defined by
Ip(π) :=

∑
m≥1
|(πm+1)p − (πm)p| if p <∞,
sup
m≥1
πm if p =∞.
When Ip(π) is small, it means that players are very patient. When in addition
p <∞, it means that the variations of π with respect to m are small.
Proposition 1 Let π ∈ ∆(N∗) and p, p′ ∈ R∗+, such that p ≤ p′. Then
- Ip′(π) ≤ (p′/p)Ip(π),
- I∞(π) ≤ (Ip(π))1/p.
Proof Let m ∈ N∗ and q := p′/p. The Mean Value Theorem implies that∣∣∣(πm+1)p′ − (πm)p′ ∣∣∣ = |[(πm+1)p]q − [(πm)p]q| ≤ q |(πm+1)p − (πm)p| ,
and it yields: Ip′(π) ≤ qIp(π). As for the second inequality, we have
(πm)
p =
∑
m′≥m
[(πm′)
p − (πm′+1)p] ≤ Ip(π),
and it yields: I∞(π) ≤ (Ip(π))1/p. ⊓⊔
Remark 1 When (πm)m≥1 is decreasing, for all p ∈ R∗+, we have Ip(π) = (π1)p.
Consequently, given p, p′ ∈ R∗+ such that p ≤ p′, there does not exist a real
number C(p, p′) > 0 such that for all π ∈ ∆(N∗), Ip′(π) ≥ C(p, p′)Ip(π).
Let us fix a stochastic game Γ , and let v∞ = limλ→0 vλ = limn→+∞ vn be its
uniform value. For f a real-valued function, denote by ‖f‖∞ the supremum of
f .
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Definition 4 Let p ∈ (0,+∞]. The stochastic game Γ has a p-asymptotic
value if for all ǫ > 0, there exists α > 0 such that for all π ∈ ∆(N∗) verifying
Ip(π) ≤ α, we have ‖vπ − v∞‖∞ ≤ ǫ.
Remark 2
- If for some p′ ∈ (0,+∞], the game Γ has a p′-asymptotic value, it has a
p-asymptotic value for all p ≤ p′. It results directly from Proposition 1.
- By Theorem 2, any Markov decision process has a 1-asymptotic value.
- Finite absorbing games have an ∞-asymptotic value (see Cardaliaguet
et al. [2012]).
- The Markov chain described at the beginning of this subsection has no
p-asymptotic value for all p > 1.
Recall that (vλ) can be expanded in Puiseux series (see Bewley and Kohlberg
[1976]): there exists β > 0, M ∈ N∗ and rm ∈ RK such that for all k ∈ K and
λ ∈ [0, β)
vλ(k) =
∑
m≥0
rm(k)λ
m
M , (1)
with the convention v0 := v∞.
Definition 5 Let m0 = inf {m ≥ 1 | rm 6= 0}. The quantity s := m0/M ∈
[0,+∞] is called the order of Γ .
Note that if s < +∞, there exists C > 0 such that for all (λ, λ′) ∈ [0, β)2, we
have
‖vλ − vλ′‖∞ ≤ C |λs − λ′s| . (2)
If A is a finite set, the cardinal of A is denoted by CardA. By Remark 3
in Oliu-Barton [2014], we have
s ≥ (CardK Card I)−
√
CardK Card I .
Now we can state our main theorem.
Theorem 3 The stochastic game Γ has a s-asymptotic value. In particular,
if p ∈ R∗+ is smaller or equal to (CardK Card I)−
√
CardK Card I , then Γ has a
p-asymptotic value.
Proof Neyman has shown that in a stochastic game the convergence of (vn)
can be deduced from the Shapley equation and the fact that (vλ) is absolutely
continuous with respect to λ (see [Sorin, 2002, Theorem C.8, p. 177]). We use
similar tools.
Let π ∈ ∆(N∗) and r ∈ N such that there exists m ≥ r + 2, πm 6= 0. A
sequence of weights πr ∈ ∆(N∗) is defined in the following way: for m ∈ N∗,
πrm :=

πm+r∑
m′≥r+1
πm′
if πm+r 6= 0,
0 if πm+r = 0.
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Let λr := π
r
1 . Let k ∈ K. Shapley equations yield (see Cardaliaguet et al.
[2012]):
vπr (k) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
{
λrg(k, x, y) + (1− λr)Ekx,y(vπr+1)
}
(3)
= min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)
{
λrg(k, x, y) + (1− λr)Ekx,y(vπr+1)
}
(4)
and
vλr (k) = max
x∈∆(I)
min
y∈∆(J)
{
λrg(k, x, y) + (1− λr)Ekx,y(vλr )
}
(5)
= min
y∈∆(J)
max
x∈∆(I)
{
λrg(k, x, y) + (1− λr)Ekx,y(vλr )
}
, (6)
where
E
k
x,y(f) :=
∑
(k′,i,j)∈K×I×J
x(i)y(j)q(k, i, j)(k′)f(k′) (7)
and
g(k, x, y) :=
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
x(i)y(j)g(k, i, j). (8)
Note that these equations also hold when λr = 0, with the convention v0 :=
v∞. Let x ∈ ∆(I) be optimal in (3) and y ∈ ∆(J) be optimal in (6). We have
vπr (k) ≤ λrg(k, x, y) + (1 − λr)Ekx,y(vπr+1) (9)
and
vλr (k) ≥ λrg(k, x, y) + (1 − λr)Ekx,y(vλr ). (10)
Combining the two inequalities yields:
vπr (k)− vλr (k) ≤ (1− λr) ‖vπr+1 − vλr‖∞ .
Symmetrically, if x′ ∈ ∆(I) is optimal in (4) and y′ ∈ ∆(J) is optimal in (5),
then
vλr (k)− vπr (k) ≤ (1− λr) ‖vπr+1 − vλr‖∞ ,
and thus
‖vπr − vλr‖∞ ≤ (1− λr) ‖vπr+1 − vλr‖∞ . (11)
Let Πr :=
r−1∏
r′=0
(1 − λr′) =
∑
m≥r+1
πm. Note that lim
r→+∞
Πr = 0. The last
inequality yields:
Πr ‖vπr − vλr‖∞ ≤ Πr+1
∥∥vπr+1 − vλr+1∥∥∞ +Πr+1 ∥∥vλr+1 − vλr∥∥∞ .
LetN ∈ N∗ such that there existsm ≥ N+1, πm 6= 0. Summing this inequality
over r ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1} yields:
‖vπ − vλ0‖∞ ≤ ΠN ‖vπN − vλN ‖∞ +
N∑
r=1
Πr
∥∥vλr − vλr−1∥∥∞ . (12)
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Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1). Let N0 := max {N ≥ 1 | ΠN ≥ ǫ}. We have ΠN0 ≤ ǫ + I∞(π).
For N = N0, inequality (12) writes:
‖vπ − vλ0‖∞ ≤ ǫ+ I∞(π) +
N0∑
r=1
∥∥vλr − vλr−1∥∥∞ . (13)
Assume that I∞(π) < ǫβ (see equation (1) for the definition of β).
Thus λr ≤ I∞(π)/ΠN0 < β for all r ∈ {0, 1, ..., N0}. If s =∞, then∑N0
r=1
∥∥vλr − vλr−1∥∥∞ = 0, and the last inequality proves that Γ has an ∞-
asymptotic value. Assume now that s < ∞. Using (2), let us majorize the
term on the right in inequality (13):
N0∑
r=1
∥∥vλr − vλr−1∥∥∞ ≤ C N0∑
r=1
|(λr)s − (λr−1)s| .
Let r ∈ {1, 2, ..., N0}. The quantity |(λr)s − (λr−1)s| is smaller than∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(πr+1)
s ∑
m≥r+1
πm
s −
(πr)
s ∑
m≥r+1
πm
s
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(πr)
s ∑
m≥r+1
πm
s −
(πr)
s∑
m≥r
πm
s
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
By definition of N0, we have∑
m≥r
πm ≥
∑
m≥r+1
πm ≥ ǫ.
Therefore we can majorize the term on the left by ǫ−s |(πr+1)s − (πr)s|. As for
the term on the right, by the Mean Value theorem we have ∑
m≥r+1
πm
−s −
∑
m≥r
πm
−s ≤ s
 ∑
m≥r+1
πm
−1−s πr
≤ sǫ−1−sπr.
Finally we have∑
r≥1
|(λr)s − (λr−1)s| ≤
∑
r≥1
(
ǫ−s |(πr+1)s − (πr)s|+ sǫ−1−s(πr)1+s
)
≤ ǫ−sIs(π) + sǫ−1−sI∞(π)s
≤ (ǫ−s + sǫ−1−s)Is(π).
Plugging this into (13) gives
‖vπ − vλ0‖∞ ≤ ǫ+ Is(π)1/s + C
(
ǫ−s + sǫ−1−s
)
Is(π).
Thus for Is(π) sufficiently small, we have both ‖vπ − vλ0‖∞ ≤ ǫ and
‖vλ0 − v∞‖∞ ≤ ǫ, which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
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Corollary 2 Let (πn) ∈ (∆(N∗))N such that for all p > 0, lim
n→+∞
Ip(π
n) = 0.
Then in any stochastic game, (vπn)n≥0 converges to v∞.
Proof Let Γ be a stochastic game of order s ∈ (0,+∞]. By Theorem 3, Γ has a
s-asymptotic value. By assumption, we have lim
n→+∞
Is(π
n) = 0, thus (vπn)n≥0
converges to v∞. ⊓⊔
The following remarks show that for the asymptotic approach, Corollary 2 is
more general than Corollary 1 and Theorem 2.
Remark 3
- When (πm)m≥1 is decreasing, for all p > 0, Ip(π) = (π1)p. According to
Corollary 2, (vπ) converges when π1 goes to 0 (compare with the asymptotic
approach in Corollary 1).
- When s = 1, the mapping λ → vλ is Lipschitz. For instance, this is the
case when Γ is a Markov decision process: see [Sorin, 2002, Chapter 5,
Proposition 5.20]. By Theorem 3, Γ has a 1-asymptotic value (compare
with the asymptotic approach in Theorem 2).
- For (l, n) ∈ N×N∗, let πl,n = n−11l+1≤m≤l+n. The (πl,n) are non-monotonic
sequences, thus Corollary 1 does not apply. Nevertheless, Is(π
l,n) = 2n−s.
Consequently, for any ǫ > 0, there exists n¯ ∈ N∗ such that for all n ≥ n¯,
for all l ∈ N, Is(πl,n) ≤ ǫ. By Theorem 3, Γ has a s-asymptotic value, and
we deduce that
lim
n→+∞
sup
l∈N
‖vπl,n − v∞‖∞ = 0.
2.2 Absorbing games
In this subsection, we relax the finiteness assumption on the action sets.
An absorbing state is a state such that once it is reached, the game remains
in this state forever, and the payoff does not depend on the actions (absorbing
payoff ). An absorbing game is a stochastic game that has at most one nonab-
sorbing state.
Mertens et al. [2009] have proved the existence of the uniform value in ab-
sorbing games with compact action sets and separately continuous transition
and payoff functions. In particular, (vλ) converges. Adapting the proof of the
previous subsection, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Let Γ be an absorbing game with compact action sets and
separately continuous transition and payoff functions. Then, Γ has an ∞-
asymptotic value.
Remark 4 For finite I and J , this result was stated in Cardaliaguet et al.
[2012], with a sketch of proof. Here, we provide a complete and simpler demon-
stration, which holds in a more general framework.
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Proof Again, we adopt the convention v0 := v∞. The Shapley equations
(3), (4), (5) and (6) still hold true for compact action sets (see Maitra and
Parthasarathy [1970]). The only difference is that in (7) and (8), the sum has
to be replaced by an integral.
If k∗ is an absorbing state, we have vπ(k∗) = vλ(k∗), for any π ∈ ∆(N∗) and
λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let k be the only non-absorbing state of the game, and r ∈ N. In
the previous proof, inequalities (9) and (10) yield:
(vπr − vλr )(k) ≤ (1− λr)µr(vπr+1 − vλr )(k),
where µr is the probability that the game is not absorbed, when Player 1 (resp.
2) plays an optimal strategy x (resp. y) in (3) (resp. (6)). In what follows, for
simplicity we omit the variable k.
Let Πr =
r−1∏
m=0
(1− λr)µr . Relying on the same steps as in the previous proof,
we get the analogous of (13), where N0 is defined similarly:
(vπ − vλ0 ) ≤ (ǫ+ I∞(π)) +
N0∑
r=1
Πr(vλr − vλr−1). (14)
Let us majorize the right-hand side. The sequence (Πr)r≥0 is decreasing. More-
over, for all r ∈ {1, 2, ..., N0}, we have∑
m≥r+1
πm ≥ Πr ≥ ǫ.
Hence, λr ∈ [0, I∞(π)/ǫ]. Let V := supλ∈[0,I∞(π)/ǫ] vλ. We have:
N0∑
r=1
Πr(vλr − vλr−1 ) =
N0∑
r=1
Πrvλr −
N0−1∑
r=0
Πr+1vλr
=
N0−1∑
r=1
(Πr −Πr+1)vλr +ΠN0vλN0 −Π1vλ0
≤ V
N0−1∑
r=1
(Πr −Πr+1) +ΠN0vλN0 −Π1vλ0
≤ V (Π1 −ΠN0) +ΠN0vλN0 −Π1vλ0
= Π1 (V − vλ0)−ΠN0
(
V − vλN0
)
≤ |V − vλ0 |+
∣∣V − vλN0 ∣∣ .
Because (vλ) converges to v∞ when λ goes to 0, the term |V − vλ| vanishes
when λ goes to 0. Consequently, the right-hand side of the last inequality goes
to 0 when I∞(π) goes to 0. Together with (14), this shows that the positive
part of (vπ − vλ0) goes to 0 when I∞(π) goes to 0.
Symmetrically, one can show that the negative part of (vπ − vλ0) goes to 0
when I∞(π) goes to 0. Hence, the proposition is proved. ⊓⊔
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2.3 An example
We construct a stochastic game of order 1/2, which has no p-asymptotic
value for any p > 1/2. First, this shows that our main result (see Theorem 3)
cannot be improved, second this implies that Theorem 2 does not extend to
the Two-Player Case.
Let us consider the following stochastic game Γ :
Table 1 Transition and payoff functions in state ω1 and ω2
ω1 L R
T 1
−→
1
M 0 0
B
−→
1 1∗
ω2 L R
T 0
←−
0
M 0 0
B
←−
0 0∗
The set of states of the game is K = {ω1, ω2, 1∗, 0∗}. The action set is
I = {T,M,B} for Player 1 and J = {L,R} for Player 2. States 1∗ and 0∗ are
absorbing states with absorbing payoff respectively 1 and 0. The payoff and
transition functions in state ω1 (resp. ω2) are described by the left table (resp.
the right one). The symbol
−→
1 (resp.
←−
0 ) means that the payoff is 1 (resp. 0)
and the game moves on to state ω2 (resp. ω1). When there is no arrow or star,
this means that the game remains in the same state.
In Vigeral [2013], a similar stochastic game Γ ′ is mentioned. The only differ-
ence is that in Γ ′, Player 1 has only the two actions T and B. The uniform
value v′∞ of Γ
′ satisfies v′∞(ω1) = v
′
∞(ω2) = 1/2. In addition, the order of
Γ ′ is 1/2. Moreover, for all ǫ > 0, the stationary strategy x (resp. y) for
Player 1 (resp. 2) defined by x(ω1) = x(ω2) = (1 −
√
λ) · T +
√
λ · B (resp.
y(ω1) = y(ω2) = (1−
√
λ) · L+
√
λ ·R) is ǫ-optimal in Γ ′λ, for λ small enough
(they are asymptotically optimal strategies).
In our example, in Γλ, the action M is dominated by T in every state. Thus
for all λ ∈ (0, 1], vλ = v′λ. In particular, Γ has order 1/2, and its uniform value
v∞ satisfies v∞(ω1) = v∞(ω2) = 1/2. In addition, the strategy x (resp. y) is
an asymptotically optimal stationary strategy for Player 1 (resp. 2) in Γλ.
Remark 5
– Assume that for some α > 0, Player 1 plays (1− α) · T + α ·B in state ω2
until the state changes. Whatever Player 2 plays, Player 1 spends at most
a number of stages of order α−1 in state ω2 before moving to state ω1 or
0∗, and the probability that the state goes to 0∗ and not to ω1 is at most
of order α. Hence, for Player 1 there is a trade-off between staying not too
long in state ω2, and having a low probability of being absorbed in 0
∗. In
view of what precedes, the optimal trade-off in Γλ is α ≈
√
λ.
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– Let θ ∈ ∆(N∗). At some stagem in Γθ, the actionM may not be dominated
by T in state ω1. Indeed, if θm = 0, the stage payoff is 0 whatever the
actions played. Thus, it is optimal for Player 1 to playM , because it makes
the state remain in ω1. The example builds on this fact. By contrast, for
any θ ∈ ∆(N∗), in Γθ, the actionM is dominated by T in state ω2. In what
follows, we build a family of strategies for Player 1 that all use action M
in state ω2, but this is only to make the proof easier.
Theorem 4 For all p > 1/2, the game Γ has no p-asymptotic value.
The remainder of the subsection is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 4. Let
us introduce the following piece of notation: given three sequences of strictly
positive real numbers (un)n≥1, (vn)n≥1 and (wn)n≥1, we write un = vn+o(wn)
if the sequence ([un − vn]/wn)n≥1 converges to 0.
To simplify the presentation, we first show that Γ has no 1-asymptotic
value. Let n ∈ N∗. For l ∈ {0, 1, ..., n3 − 1}, define an(l) := l(n+ n5) + 1 and
bn(l) := l(n+ n
5) + n. Let E1 := ∪
0≤l≤n3−1
{an(l), an(l) + 1, ..., bn(l)}.
We consider the sequence πn ∈ ∆(N∗) defined by
πnm := n
−4 if m ∈ E1, and πnm := 0 otherwise. We have
I1(π
n) = (2n3 − 1)n−4,
thus lim
n→+∞
I1(π
n) = 0. We show below that lim
n→+∞
vπn(ω1) = 1.
We consider the Markovian strategy σn ∈ Σ for Player 1, described by the
following table:
Table 2 Strategy σn
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
state
stage
m ∈ E1 m /∈ E1
km = ω1
(
1− n−2) · T + n−2 · B M
km = ω2 M
(
1− n−4) · T + n−4 · B
We show that for any ǫ > 0, for any n sufficiently large, σn guarantees the
payoff 1− ǫ in Γω1πn for Player 1.
Let τn be a pure Markovian best-response to σn in Γω1πn . Let Ωn be the
event
Ωn := ∩
l∈{0,1,...,n3−1}
{
kan(l) ∈ {ω1, 1∗}
}
.
When the state of the game is ω2 and m /∈ E1, Player 1 plays B with
probability n−4. By Remark 5, Player 1 spends at most a number of stages of
order n4 in ω2, and the state goes to 0
∗ with a probability at most of order
n−4. As a result, if for some l ∈ {0, ..., n3 − 1} the state is in ω2 at stage
bn(l) + 1, the probability that it will move to ω1 before stage an(l + 1) is
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at least of order 1 − n−4. Once the state has moved to ω1, Player 1 plays
M and the state remains in ω1 until stage an(l + 1). Hence the probability
that kan(l) lies in {ω1, 1∗} for any l in
{
0, 1, ..., n3 − 1} is at least of order
(1 − n−4)n3 = 1 + o(1). This informal discussion provides intuition for the
following lemma.
Lemma 1
lim
n→+∞
P
ω1
σn,τn(Ωn) = 1.
For notational convenience, in the proof of this lemma and the proof of the
next proposition, for n ∈ N∗, Pω1σn,τn is denoted by P and Eω1σn,τn is denoted by
E.
Proof Let n ∈ N∗ and l ∈ {0, ..., n3 − 1}. Let us minorize the probability
P
(
kan(l+1) ∈ {ω1, 1∗} |kan(l) ∈ {ω1, 1∗}
)
.
First, notice that P
(
kbn(l)+1 6= 0∗|kan(l) ∈ {ω1, ω∗1}
)
= 1 (see Table 2). Let us
now analyze how the state may evolve during the block
{bn(l) + 1, bn(l) + 2, ..., an(l + 1)− 1}, discriminating between the case
kbn(l) = 1
∗, kbn(l) = ω1, and kbn(l) = ω2:
- P
(
kan(l+1) = 1
∗|kbn(l)+1 = 1∗
)
= 1.
- If kbn(l)+1 = ω1, then Player 1 will play M at each stage
m ∈ {bn(l) + 1, bn(l) + 2, ..., an(l + 1)− 1}. Therefore, the state will re-
main in ω1:
P(kan(l+1) = ω1|kbn(l)+1 = ω1) = 1.
- If kbn(l)+1 = ω2, then Player 1 will play (1− n−4) · T + n−4 · B as long as
the state is ω2 and m ≤ an(l+1)− 1. We discriminate between two cases:
– if Player 2 plays L as long as the state is ω2 and m ≤ an(l+1)− 1, the
game will never be absorbed in 0∗, and the probability that the state
will move to ω1 before stage an(l + 1) is equal to 1 −
(
1− n−4)n5 . If
the state moves to ω1 at some stage m ≤ an(l + 1) − 1, then Player
1 will play M until stage an(l + 1), thus the state will remain in ω1.
Consequently, in this case we have
P(kan(l+1) = ω1|kbn(l)+1 = ω2) = 1−
(
1− n−4)n5 .
– if Player 2 playsR at one stage in {bn(l) + 1, bn(l) + 2, ..., an(l + 1)− 1},
and if at the first stage he does so the state is ω2, then with probabil-
ity 1 − n−4 the state will move to ω1. It will remain in ω1 until stage
an(l + 1). If the state has already switched to ω1 before Player 2 plays
R, then it will remain in ω1 until stage an(l+1). Therefore, in this case
we have
P(kan(l+1) = ω1|kbn(l)+1 = ω2) ≥ 1− n−4.
The last two subcases show that
P(kan(l+1) = ω1|kbn(l)+1 = ω2) ≥ min
{
1− (1− n−4)n5 , 1− n−4} .
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This exhaustive study shows that
P(kan(l+1) ∈ {ω1, 1∗} |kan(l) ∈ {ω1, 1∗}) ≥ min
{
1− (1− n−4)n5 , 1− n−4} .
We have
(
1− n−4)n5 = o(n−4), thus for n large enough, the minimum in the
above equation is reached at 1− n−4. By induction, it yields
P(Ωn) ≥
n3−1∏
l=0
(1− n−4) = 1 + o(1),
and the lemma is proved. ⊓⊔
Now we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The game Γ has no 1-asymptotic value.
Proof Let n ∈ N∗. We minorize γω1πn(σn, τn) by a quantity that goes to 1 as n
goes to infinity.
The last lemma shows that with high probability, at the beginning of each block
{an(l), an(l) + 1, ..., bn(l)}, the state is either ω1 or 1∗. Recall that these blocks
exactly correspond to the stages where the payoff weight is nonzero. Hence, to
get a good payoff between stage an(l) and stage bn(l), Player 2 should make
the state move from ω1 to ω2 at least before stage bn(l). If Player 2 plays L
at each stage m ∈ {an(l), an(l) + 1, ..., bn(l)}, with probability greater than
1− (1 − n−2)n, the state will remain in ω1 until stage bn(l). This probability
goes to 1 as n goes to infinity, which is a bad outcome for Player 2. Thus,
Player 2 should play R at some stage m ∈ {an(l), an(l) + 1, ..., bn(l)}. We
show that:
- either the number of l ∈ {0, 1, ..., n3 − 1} such that Player 2 plays at least
one time R in {an(l), an(l) + 1, ..., bn(l)} is small, and thus the total payoff
in Γω1πn is close to 1,
- either the number of l ∈ {0, 1, ..., n3 − 1} such that Player 2 plays at
least one time R in {an(l), an(l) + 1, ..., bn(l)} is high. In this case, with
probability close to 1, the state is absorbed in 1∗ very rapidly, thus the
total payoff in Γω1πn is close to 1.
Let n ∈ N∗ and l ∈ {0, 1, ..., n3 − 1}, and Ωn(l) be the event defined by
Ωn(l) := ∩
0≤l′≤l
{
kan(l′) ∈ {ω1, 1∗}
}
.
Note that Ωn(n
3 − 1) = Ωn. Let
Mn(l) := {l′ ∈ {0, 1, ..., l} | ∃m ∈ {an(l), an(l) + 1, ..., bn(l)} , τn(m,ω1) = R} ,
and let Mn(l) := {0, 1, ..., l} \Mn(l). If l ∈Mn(n3 − 1), let
mn(l) := min {m ∈ {an(l), an(l) + 1, ..., bn(l)} | τn(m,ω1) = R} .
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Fix δ ∈ (0, 1]. Let ln := max
{
l ∈ {0, 1, ..., n3 − 1} | CardMn(l) ≤ δn3}. We
show that between stages 1 and bn(ln), Player 2 did not play R a sufficient
number of times to impact the total payoff, and at stage bn(ln) + 1, either
ln = n
3 − 1 and the game is finished, or he has played too many times R, in
such a way that the state has been absorbed in 1∗ with high probability.
By definition of ln, we have CardMn(ln) ≤ δn3, and if ln < n3 − 1, then
CardMn(ln) ≥ δn3 − 1.
We have
E
bn(ln)∑
m=1
πnmgm
 = 1
n4
ln∑
l=0
E
 bn(l)∑
m=an(l)
gm

≥ 1
n4
∑
l∈Mn(ln)
E
1Ωn(l) bn(l)∑
m=an(l)
gm
 . (15)
If l ∈Mn(ln) and kan(l) = ω1, Player 2 plays L as long as km = ω1 and
m ≤ bn(l), while Player 1 plays (1−n−2)·T+n−2 ·B. As a result, if kan(l) = ω1,
the probability that the state remains in ω1 until stage bn(l) is
αn := (1− n−2)n. Thus, the last inequality yields
E
bn(ln)∑
m=1
πnmgm
 ≥ n−3CardMn(ln)P(Ωn)αn (16)
≥ (n−3(ln + 1)− δ)P(Ωn)αn. (17)
Case 1 ln = n
3 − 1.
By (16) and Lemma 1, there exists n¯ ∈ N∗ such that for all n ≥ n¯ verifying
ln = n
3 − 1,
γω1πn(σ
n, τn) ≥ 1− 2δ. (18)
Case 2 ln < n
3 − 1.
Let n ∈ N∗ such that ln < n3 − 1. In particular, |Mn(ln)| ≥ δn3 − 1 and∣∣∣Mn(ln)∣∣∣ ≤ ln − δn3 + 2.
We are going to show the following inequality:
P(kbn(ln) = 1
∗) ≥ P(Ωn)−
(
1− n−2 (1− n−2)n)δn3−1 := βn. (19)
The idea is the following. Each time Player 2 plays R in state ω1, the state goes
to 1∗ with probability n−2. If kan(l) = ω1 and l ∈Mn(l), then at each stagem ∈
{an(l), an(l) + 1, ...,mn(l)− 1}, Player 2 will play L, hence at each of these
stages the state will remain in ω1 with probability n
−2. Sincemn(l)−an(l) ≤ n,
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with high probability kmn(l) = ω1. At stagemn(l), Player 2 plays R. Thus with
high probability, conditionnal to the event Ωn(ln), before stage bn(ln) Player
2 has played more than δn3 − 1 times the action R in state ω1, leading the
state to be absorbed in 1∗ before stage bn(ln) with high probability.
Formally, if l ∈ {0, 1, ..., ln}, we have
P(
{
kbn(l) 6= 1∗
} ∩Ωn(l)) = P({kbn(l) 6= 1∗} ∩ {kan(l) = ω1} ∩Ωn(l))
= P(
{
kbn(l) 6= 1∗
} |{kan(l) = ω1} ∩Ωn(l))
× P({kan(l) = ω1} ∩Ωn(l)). (20)
First we majorize the first term P1 := P(kbn(l) 6= 1∗|
{
kan(l) = ω1
} ∩ Ωn(l)).
If l /∈Mn(l), we simply majorize it by 1. Assume now that l ∈Mn(l). By the
Markov property (σn and τn are Markovian strategies), we have
P1 = P(kbn(l) 6= 1∗|
{
kan(l) = ω1
}
)
= P(
{
kbn(l) 6= 1∗
} ∩ {kmn(l) = ω1} |{kan(l) = ω1})
+ P(
{
kbn(l) 6= 1∗
} ∩ {kmn(l) 6= ω1} |{kan(l) = ω1}).
Let P3 := P(kmn(l) 6= ω1|kan(l) = ω1). The last equality and the Markov
property give
P1 ≤ P(kbn(l) 6= 1∗|
{
kmn(l) = ω1
} ∩ {kan(l) = ω1})(1 − P3) + P3
= P(kbn(l) 6= 1∗|kmn(l) = ω1)(1 − P3) + P3. (21)
If kmn(l) = ω1, then at stage mn(l) Player 2 plays the action R, hence the
state is absorbed in 1∗ with probability n−2. Thus
P(kbn(l) 6= 1∗|kmn(l) = ω1) ≤ 1− n−2. (22)
If kan(l) = ω1, then at each stage m ∈ {an(l), an(l) + 1, ...,mn(l)− 1}, Player
2 will play L, hence at each stage the state will remain in ω1 with probability
1− n−2, and mn(l)− an(l) ≤ n. We deduce that
P3 ≤ 1−
(
1− n−2)n . (23)
Combining (21), (22) and (23) gives
P1 ≤
(
1− n−2) (1 − P3) + P3
= 1+ n−2(P3 − 1)
≤ 1− n−2 (1− n−2)n . (24)
As for the second term in (20), we have
P(
{
kan(l) = ω1
} ∩Ωn(l)) ≤ P({kbn(l−1) 6= 1∗} ∩Ωn(l − 1)). (25)
Combining (20), (24) and (25), we deduce that if l ∈Mn(l), then
P(
{
kbn(l) 6= 1∗
}∩Ωn(l)) ≤ (1− n−2 (1− n−2)n)P({kbn(l−1) 6= 1∗}∩Ωn(l−1)).
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Because |Mn(ln)| ≥ δn3 − 1, by induction we obtain
P(
{
kbn(ln) 6= 1∗
} ∩Ωn(ln)) ≤ (1− n−2 (1− n−2)n)δn3−1 ,
and inequality (19) follows. Now we can minorize the other part of the payoff:
E
 ∑
m≥bn(ln)+1
πnmgm
 ≥ E
1{kbn(ln)=1∗} ∑
m≥bn(ln)+1
πnm

= n−3(n3 − ln − 1)P(
{
kbn(ln) = 1
∗})
≥ (1− n−3(ln + 1))βn. (26)
Inequalities (17) and (26) yield
E
∑
m≥1
πnmgm
 = E
bn(ln)∑
m=1
πnmgm
+ E
 ∑
m≥bn(ln)+1
πnmgm

≥ (n−3(ln + 1)− δ)P(Ωn)αn +
(
1− n−3(ln + 1)
)
βn.
The sequences (αn)n≥1, (βn)n≥1 and (P(Ωn))n≥1 converge to 1, thus there
exists n1 ∈ N∗ such that for all n ≥ n1 verifying ln < n3 − 1, we have
vπn(ω1) ≥ γω1πn(σn, τn) ≥ 1− 2δ. (27)
Because τn is a best-response strategy to σn in Γω1πn , inequalities (18) and
(27) show that for n ≥ max(n¯, n1), we have
vπn(ω1) ≥ γω1πn(σn, τn) ≥ 1− 2δ. (28)
Because δ ∈ (0, 1] is arbitrary, the sequence (vπn(ω1))n≥1 converges to 1, and
Γ has no 1-asymptotic value. ⊓⊔
Now we can prove Theorem 4.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4) Let ǫ > 0 and p := 1/2+ ǫ. Proving that Γ has no
p-asymptotic value proceeds in the same way as previously. The only difference
is that the sequence of weights (πn) has to be modified. Let ǫ > 0 and n ∈ N∗.
In what follows, the integer part of a real number x is denoted by ⌊x⌋. Define
two integers N1 and N2 by
N1 := ⌊n2−ǫ⌋ and N2 := ⌊n2+ǫ⌋.
For l ∈ {0, 1, ..., N2 − 1}, let a′n(l) := l(N1+n5)+1 and b′n(l) := l(N1+n5)+N1.
Let
E′1 := ∪
l∈{0,1,...,N2}
{a′n(l), a′n(l) + 1, ..., b′n(l)} .
Let π′n ∈ ∆(N∗) defined in the following way: for m ∈ N∗,
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π′nm :=

n−4 if m ∈ E′1 \ {N1 + 1} ,
1−
∑
m 6=N1+1
π′nm if m = N1 + 1,
0 if m /∈ E′1.
We have
Ip(π
′n) ≤ ⌊n2+ǫ⌋n−4(1/2+ǫ) + 2π′nN1+1.
Hence lim
n→+∞
Ip(π
′n) = 0. We claim that lim
n→+∞
vπ′n(ω1) = 1. The proof is the
same as above. We still consider the same strategy σn for Player 1 in Γ π
′n
.
Lemma 1 is still true. Indeed, the length of the blocks
{b′n(l) + 1, b′n(l) + 2, ..., a′n(l + 1)− 1} is still n5.
Now let us check the remainder of the proof. The quantity (1− n−2)n2−ǫ goes
to 1 as n goes to infinity. Hence if l ∈ {0, ..., N2} and kl(N1+n5)+1 = ω1, to
get a good payoff between stage a′n(l) and stage b
′
n(l), Player 2 should make
the state move from ω1 to ω2 at least before stage bn(l). Thus, he has to play
R at least one time, and take a risk of being absorbed in ω1 of n
−2. There
are approximately n2+ǫ such blocks. Since (1 − n−2)n2+ǫ goes to 0 as n goes
to infinity, the same proof as before shows that, when n goes to infinity, the
sequence (vπn(ω1))n≥1 converges to 1. ⊓⊔
3 Uniform approach
To relax the assumption that sequences of weights are decreasing in Corol-
lary 1, the simplest sequences of weights one can imagine are the πl,n defined
in Remark 3: πl,n := n−11l+1≤m≤l+n. As we have seen, Theorem 3 shows that
for any stochastic game,
lim
n→+∞ supl∈N
‖vπl,n − v∞‖∞ = 0.
Is it possible to show the existence of strategies that are approximately opti-
mal in any game Γπl,n , for any l ≥ 0 and n big enough, for both players? We
provide an example of an absorbing game where this property does not hold.
Thus, no natural extension of Theorem 1 to sequences of weights which are
not decreasing seems to exists.
Consider the following absorbing game, introduced by Gillette [1957] under
the name of ”Big Match”. The state space is K = {ω, 1∗, 0∗}, where 1∗ (resp.
0∗) is an absorbing state with payoff 1 (resp. 0). Action sets for Player 1 and
2 are respectively I = {T,B} and J = {L,R}. The payoff and transition
functions in state ω are described by the following table:
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Fig. 1 Transition and payoff functions in state ω
❍
❍
❍
❍
❍
J1
J2
L R
T 1∗ 0∗
B 0 1
As any stochastic game, the Big Match has a uniform value v∞, and
v∞(ω) = 1/2 (see [Sorin, 2002, Chapitre 5, p.93]). The stationary strategy
1/2 · L + 1/2 · R is a 0-optimal uniform strategy for Player 2. Constructing
ǫ-optimal uniform strategy for Player 1 is more tricky (see Blackwell and Fer-
guson [1968]).
Now we investigate the general uniform approach in the Big Match.
Definition 6 Let Γ be a stochastic game, and k1 the initial state. Player 1
can guarantee uniformly in the general sense α ∈ R in Γ k1 if for all ǫ > 0,
there exists σ∗ ∈ Σ and N1 ∈ N∗ such that for all τ ∈ T , n ≥ N1 and n¯ ∈ N,
we have
E
k1
σ∗,τ
(
1
n
n¯+n∑
m=n¯+1
gm
)
≥ α− ǫ. (29)
First, let us explain why Player 1 can not guarantee uniformly more than 0 in
the general sense. Assume the contrary: Player 1 can guarantee uniformly in
the general sense α > 0. Let (N1, σ
∗) ∈ N∗ × Σ corresponding to ǫ = α/2 in
(29). The stationary strategy α/10 · L+ (1− α/10) · R is denoted by y.
On the one hand, Player 1 should not play T at any stage of the game, against
the strategy y. On the other hand, in the infinitely repeated game, with high
probability Player 2 will play L at N1 random consecutive stages. At that
point, Player 1 does not know if Player 2 has switched to a pure strategy that
plays L at any stage, or if he still plays y. In the first case, Player 1 should play
T at least one time during these N1 stages, but in the second case, he should
not play T . Thus, he cannot guarantee a good payoff against both strategies.
This provides intuition for the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Player 1 cannot guarantee uniformly more than 0 in the gen-
eral sense.
Remark 6 This proposition shows in particular that Theorem 2 (Renault and
Venel) does not generalize to zero-sum stochastic games, even for absorbing
games: the game Γ has no general uniform value.
Proof The same notations as in the above discussion are used.
For n ∈ N∗, let An be the event {Player 1 plays T before stage n}, and let
An be the complement of An. The sequence (Pσ∗,y(An))n≥1 is increasing and
bounded by 1, therefore it converges to some l ∈ [0, 1]. Let N0 ∈ N∗ such that
for all n ≥ N0,
Pσ∗,y(An) ≥ l − α/10.
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To avoid confusion, in what follows h denotes an element ofH∞, and h˜ denotes
the random variable with values in H∞ describing the infinite history of the
game. Let n ≥ N0 +N1. Let Hn ⊂ H∞ be the following set:
{h ∈ H∞|∃ a(h) ∈ {N0, ..., n−N1} , ∀m ∈ {a(h) + 1, ..., a(h) +N1} , jm = L} .
There exists N2 ∈ N∗ such that
Pσ∗,y
(
h˜ ∈ HN2
)
≥ 1/2. (30)
We have
Pσ∗,y(AN0 ∩ AN2) ≥ Eσ∗,y
(
1{h˜∈Hn}Pσ∗,y′(h˜)(AN0 ∩ AN2)
)
, (31)
where for h ∈ Hn, the strategy y′(h) is the Markov strategy equal to y between
stages 1 and a(h), and equal to jm(h) for each stage m ≥ a(h) + 1.
Let h ∈ Hn. Let us now minorize Pσ∗,y′(h)(AN0 ∩ AN2).
If Player 1 plays T at some stagem ≤ a(h) against the strategy y′(h), the game
is absorbed in 1∗ with probability α/10, and in 0∗ with probability 1− α/10.
Therefore we have
Eσ∗,y′(h)
1AN0 1N1
a(h)+N1∑
m=a(h)+1
gm
 ≤ α
10
. (32)
Because h ∈ Hn, we have
Eσ∗,y′(h)
1AN2 1N1
a(h)+N1∑
m=a(h)+1
gm
 = 0. (33)
Combining (32) and (33), we obtain
Eσ∗,y′(h)
 1
N1
a(h)+N1∑
m=a(h)+1
gm
 ≤ α
10
+ Pσ∗,y′(h)(AN0 ∩ AN2),
and by (29),
Pσ∗,y′(h)(AN0 ∩AN2) ≥ α/2− α/10 = 2α/5.
Plugging the last inequality into (31) and using (30), we deduce that
Pσ∗,y(AN0 ∩AN2) ≥ Eσ∗,y
(
1{h∈Hn}2α/5
)
≥ α/5.
Because AN0 ⊂ AN2 , we have
Pσ∗,y(AN0 ∩AN2) = Pσ∗,y(AN2)− Pσ∗,y(AN0) ≤ α/10,
thus α/10 ≥ α/5, which is a contradiction. ⊓⊔
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